Pashinyan's Media War: Silencing the Opposition

Part I: The Regulator -- PSRC Under Mesrop Mesropyan

Confirmed - Regulatory Records Structural Control

Every television station, radio broadcaster, and telecommunications company in Armenia operates under a license issued by the Public Services Regulatory Commission (PSRC). The PSRC grants licenses. The PSRC renews licenses. The PSRC revokes licenses. There is no alternative regulator. There is no independent appeals process with meaningful teeth. The PSRC is the single chokepoint through which all Armenian media must pass to exist.

The PSRC is chaired by Mesrop Mesropyan.

Mesropyan's Civil Contract membership is officially "frozen" -- a legal fiction that does nothing to address the structural conflict of interest. A member of the ruling party, whose membership is suspended on paper but whose loyalty is demonstrated through action, controls who can broadcast in Armenia. Every media outlet in the country understands that their continued existence depends on this man's decisions.

This is not media regulation. This is media control with regulatory paperwork.

Part II: Shoghakat TV -- When the License Disappears

Confirmed - PSRC Records Confirmed - Media Reports

In October 2025, Shoghakat TV lost its public broadcasting status. By December 2025, it was liquidated entirely. Shoghakat TV was affiliated with the Armenian Apostolic Church -- the oldest national church in the world and one of the most established institutions in Armenian society.

The timing is not coincidental. The shutdown of Shoghakat TV occurred during the same period as an unprecedented government campaign against the Armenian Apostolic Church. In June 2025, Archbishop Bagrat Galstanyan was arrested on charges of plotting a coup. Archbishop Mikael Adjapahyan received two years in prison for "public calls for seizure of power." Bishop Mkrtich Proshyan and 12 additional clergymen were charged in October 2025. In that same month, Shoghakat TV was stripped of its broadcasting status.

The pattern is systematic. Arrest the leadership. Fabricate compromising material. Declassify selective archives. And shut down the broadcaster that might give the institution a voice. This is not a regulatory decision. It is a coordinated campaign to eliminate the Church's public communication platform at the exact moment the Church was under the most intense state pressure in modern Armenian history.

The Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention -- an organization not given to casual accusations -- described the pattern as "growing repression" and "an example of how genocidal processes become internalized."

Part III: Armenia TV -- The Country's Largest Channel on Russian Servers

Confirmed - DNS Records Confirmed - Breach Data

Armenia TV commands 19.1% of the national television market -- nearly one in five Armenian viewers. It is the single most powerful broadcaster in the country. And its corporate email infrastructure runs through Russian servers.

The MX records -- the DNS entries that determine where email is routed -- point to mx.yandex.ru. Every email sent to or from Armenia TV's corporate domain transits through Yandex servers physically located in Russia, operated by a Russian company, and subject to Russian law -- including SORM, the surveillance framework that gives Russian intelligence services legal access to all communications on Russian infrastructure.

The credential security of these accounts is catastrophic. As documented in Investigation #21, the corporate email armeniatv@mail.ru has appeared in 23 separate publicly known data breaches.

The breach patterns reveal passwords that include the most commonly breached defaults on the planet, keyboard patterns that appear in every security awareness guide, and the literal word "DEFAULT" -- suggesting a password that was never changed from initial setup. A second account used what appears to be a personal Armenian mobile phone number as its password. Twenty-three breaches, and the passwords were never rotated. This is not poor security. This is the complete absence of security culture.

No actual passwords are published in this investigation. The patterns alone tell the story: the country's dominant broadcaster operates on Russian infrastructure with credential security that would fail the most basic audit.

Part IV: Artur Janibekyan and the Minasyan Connection

Confirmed - Corporate Records Confirmed - Public Reporting

Armenia TV's owner is Artur Janibekyan -- one of the most recognized names in Armenian entertainment and media. Janibekyan's connection to Mikayel Minasyan adds a critical dimension to the question of who controls Armenia's information space.

Minasyan -- the subject of Investigation #19 -- faces 76 criminal counts and approximately 50 million in state damages. He has been a fugitive since March 2020. Despite this, he continues to control major Armenian assets including stakes in Yerevan Mall, the DoubleTree by Hilton Yerevan, and the Opera Suite Hotel. Interpol dropped his Red Notice.

The connection between Armenia TV's owner and a fugitive facing 50 million in state damages creates a structural vulnerability. It means the country's most-watched broadcaster has ownership ties to an individual who is simultaneously a target of state prosecution and a controller of significant economic assets. This is not a clean ownership structure. It is a potential leverage point -- for whoever controls the prosecution.

When the government controls broadcast licensing through the PSRC and simultaneously controls criminal prosecution through the Prosecutor General's office, and the country's largest broadcaster has ownership ties to a fugitive under prosecution, the geometry of control becomes clear. The broadcaster operates in a space defined by regulatory threat on one side and prosecutorial threat on the other.

Part V: Zhoghovurd Daily -- Credentials Revoked for Asking Questions

Confirmed - Media Reports Confirmed - Union of Journalists Statement

In December 2025, journalists from Zhoghovurd Daily ("People's Daily") asked Civil Contract faction leader Hayk Konjoryan about a suspicious property deal -- the below-market purchase of a house in the upscale Arinj suburb, financed by a mortgage from Armeconombank (controlled by oligarch Khachatur Sukiasyan, a fellow Civil Contract MP). The full details of this transaction are documented in Investigation #36.

Konjoryan complained. The National Assembly Chief of Staff revoked Zhoghovurd Daily's parliamentary press credentials.

The sequence is unambiguous. Journalists asked an uncomfortable question. A ruling party official complained. The institution stripped the journalists of their access. The professional union condemned the action. Nothing changed.

This is the mechanism of media control at the parliamentary level. You do not need to censor a newspaper directly. You remove its ability to be present where news is made. Without parliamentary credentials, Zhoghovurd Daily cannot attend sessions, cannot approach MPs in the corridors, cannot cover legislative proceedings from inside the building. The newspaper still exists, but its capacity to do parliamentary journalism has been amputated.

The message to every other journalist in Armenia is precise: ask the wrong question about the wrong person, and you lose your access. Self-censorship is cheaper than losing credentials.

Part VI: Anna Hakobyan -- Selective Impunity

Confirmed - Public Statements Critical Finding

Anna Hakobyan -- the wife of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan -- publicly called Armenian clergymen "paedophiles" and "chief maniacal perverts." The exact phrasing was reported across multiple Armenian media outlets. The allegations were not accompanied by evidence. No Armenian clergyman has been charged with paedophilia.

Armenian defamation law exists. It has been applied. Samvel Karapetyan sued Hayk Konjoryan for defamation after Konjoryan called him an "oligarch" and "former looter" in parliament. The legal system is capable of processing defamation cases when politically convenient.

When the Prime Minister's wife publicly accuses clergymen of paedophilia without evidence, and no prosecution, no investigation, and no legal consequence follows, the message is institutional. Certain people are above the law of defamation. The selective application of legal consequences based on political proximity to power is not a failure of the legal system. It is the legal system functioning as designed -- to protect the inner circle while constraining critics.

This selective impunity has a direct impact on media. Journalists observe who can say what without consequence. They observe who gets sued, who gets prosecuted, who gets their credentials revoked -- and who can make unsubstantiated accusations about paedophilia on the public record with zero repercussions. The lesson is not subtle.

Part VII: The Complete Architecture of Media Control

Pattern Analysis Systemic Finding

The individual findings, when assembled, reveal a complete architecture of media control operating through five distinct mechanisms:

No single layer is sufficient on its own. Together, they create an environment where independent journalism is structurally impossible at scale. A broadcaster can be shut down (layer 1). A newspaper can be barred from parliament (layer 2). All media communications can be monitored (layer 3). The largest channel operates under implicit threat (layer 4). And the rules that apply to critics do not apply to the ruling family (layer 5).

This is not censorship in the traditional sense. There is no censor's office, no official list of banned topics, no state media monopoly. It is something more sophisticated: a distributed system of control where each mechanism reinforces the others, and the cumulative effect is a media environment that cannot hold power accountable.

Part VIII: The PSRC's Structural Power

Confirmed - Regulatory Framework

The PSRC's authority extends beyond broadcasting. It controls all telecommunications licensing in Armenia. This means the same body that decides who can broadcast also decides who can provide internet service, mobile communications, and fixed-line telephony.

The PSRC under Mesropyan also led the revocation of Samvel Karapetyan's ENA electricity license -- an action challenged by Karapetyan's lawyers on conflict-of-interest grounds, given Mesropyan's Civil Contract affiliation. The same pattern of politically aligned regulation applies across sectors. The man who controls broadcast licenses is the same man who revoked a political rival's electricity license. The regulatory apparatus does not distinguish between sectors when it comes to political loyalty.

Complete Timeline

Evidence Summary

Armenia's media environment is not controlled by a single mechanism. It is controlled by an architecture. The PSRC decides who broadcasts. The National Assembly decides who covers parliament. Russian servers carry the communications. Prosecutorial leverage constrains the largest channel. And the Prime Minister's wife can call clergymen paedophiles without evidence and without consequence, while a newspaper loses its credentials for asking about a house purchase. This is not press freedom with imperfections. This is a media war fought through regulatory instruments, institutional access, digital infrastructure, and selective impunity -- and the opposition is losing on every front.

Related Investigations

Sources

This investigation draws on: PSRC regulatory filings and license records; DNS MX record analysis of Armenian media domains; publicly available breach databases (no passwords published -- patterns only); Armenian corporate registry records; court records and prosecution filings; Armenian media reporting on Shoghakat TV, Zhoghovurd Daily, and Anna Hakobyan's public statements; Union of Journalists of Armenia public statements; television market share data; Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention statements; open-source intelligence on Russian email infrastructure and SORM surveillance capabilities. No systems were accessed, penetrated, or tested. OWL does not publish actual passwords or credentials. OWL does not encourage unauthorized access to any system.