How Pashinyan Weaponized the NSS

Part I: The Firing of Armen Abazyan

Confirmed - Armenian Media Reports Critical Finding

In June 2025, Armenian media outlets publicly reported that NSS Director Armen Abazyan was dismissed from his position. According to these reports, Abazyan had served as Director of the National Security Service -- Armenia's primary intelligence and counterintelligence agency -- responsible for counterterrorism, border security, organized crime, and protecting state secrets.

The reported reason for his dismissal was his refusal to comply with directives related to the criminal investigation of former Prime Minister Karen Karapetyan. According to Armenian media reporting, Abazyan was asked to take specific actions in the Karapetyan case and refused. He was subsequently removed from his position.

The implications are significant. If the Director of a country's primary intelligence agency can be removed for refusing to follow political instructions in a specific criminal case, then the agency is not operating as an independent security institution. It is operating as an extension of executive power.

This is not a theoretical concern. The NSS has statutory authority over wiretapping, surveillance, detention, border control, and classified information. When the head of such an agency is removed for non-compliance with political direction, the message to every subsequent director is unambiguous: comply or be replaced.

Part II: The Replacement -- Andranik Simonyan

Confirmed - Official Appointment Confirmed - Published Academic Record

Following Abazyan's dismissal, Andranik Simonyan was appointed as the new Director of the NSS. Simonyan's background is directly relevant to understanding the trajectory of the agency.

Simonyan served as NSS Deputy Director during the period that included the high-profile cocaine trafficking investigation -- a case that intersected with customs officials and politically connected individuals. His tenure as deputy during this sensitive period and his subsequent elevation to director after Abazyan's politically-motivated dismissal establishes a clear pattern of selection.

Part III: The Surveillance Expansion Paper

Confirmed - Published Paper Critical Timeline

In July-August 2021, Andranik Simonyan co-authored an academic paper addressing the expansion of the NSS's surveillance capabilities. The paper, published through official channels, discussed the institutional framework for increasing the agency's monitoring and interception capacity.

The timeline of what followed is documented:

A senior NSS official publishes a paper arguing for expanded surveillance capabilities. Approximately two months later, commercial spyware infrastructure is identified in the country. No Armenian government institution has ever publicly acknowledged, explained, or investigated this sequence of events.

We are not asserting that the paper caused the procurement. We are documenting that the stated intent and the documented capability appeared within a two-month window, and that the person who argued for expansion was later elevated to lead the entire agency.

Part IV: Digital Vulnerabilities -- Russian Email Services

Confirmed - Breach Database Analysis Systemic Pattern

OWL's analysis of publicly available breach databases identified accounts associated with NSS leadership personnel on Russian email services. This finding is consistent with the broader pattern documented across Armenian government institutions in our previous investigations (see: Investigation #15: Russian Email Dependency and Investigation #16: The 123456 Network).

The specific credentials are not published here. The point is institutional: the leadership of Armenia's national security apparatus -- the agency responsible for counterintelligence and protecting state secrets -- uses communication channels that are, by Russian law, subject to monitoring by Russian intelligence services through the SORM system.

This means that the agency tasked with protecting Armenia from foreign intelligence penetration is itself penetrated by design -- through the communication platforms chosen by its own leadership.

Part V: 19 NSS Documents in Public Archives

Confirmed - Wayback Machine Operational Security Failure

During the course of this investigation, OWL identified 19 documents associated with the National Security Service that were found cached in the Wayback Machine -- the Internet Archive's publicly accessible web archive.

The Wayback Machine is a public service that periodically archives web pages. When documents are published on publicly accessible URLs -- even temporarily -- they can be captured and preserved indefinitely. The presence of 19 NSS documents in this archive indicates that these materials were, at some point, accessible on the public internet.

For context: intelligence agencies in functional democracies operate under strict information security protocols. Documents are classified, access-controlled, and published only through secure, authenticated systems. The presence of nearly two dozen documents from Armenia's primary intelligence agency in a public web archive represents a fundamental failure of information security discipline.

Part VI: The Pattern -- From Security Agency to Political Tool

Pattern Analysis

When viewed together, the documented facts form a coherent pattern:

This is not a single event. It is a system. The firing of Abazyan was not an anomaly -- it was the logical conclusion of a process in which the national security apparatus was progressively brought under direct political control.

When an intelligence agency's director is removed for disobedience, the agency ceases to serve the state. It serves the person who controls appointments. Every tool available to that agency -- wiretapping, surveillance, detention authority, access to classified information, border control -- becomes available for political purposes.

Complete Timeline

Evidence Summary

The National Security Service of Armenia was designed to protect the state from foreign threats, organized crime, and terrorism. Under Pashinyan's government, according to publicly reported events, it has been converted into a tool for political enforcement. The director who reportedly said no was fired. The deputy who argued for more surveillance power was promoted. The agency's own leadership communicates on platforms monitored by Russian intelligence. Its documents sit in public web archives. This is not a security agency. This is a political weapon with a surveillance budget -- and no one is watching the people who watch everyone else.

Sources

This investigation draws on: Armenian media reporting on the Abazyan dismissal, official government appointment records, published academic papers, Citizen Lab technical reports on Predator spyware infrastructure, European Parliament PEGA Committee findings, US Treasury OFAC sanctions designations, publicly available breach databases, Wayback Machine (Internet Archive) cached documents, and open-source intelligence analysis. No systems were accessed or penetrated. No passwords or credentials are published.