The Discovery
OSINT VERIFIED As part of OWL's ongoing audit of Armenian government digital infrastructure, we ran a Wayback Machine CDX sweep against elections.am -- the official website of Armenia's Central Election Commission. What we found is that the June 7, 2026 parliamentary election is already fully loaded into the system, catalogued as generalId=131.
The election has not happened yet. Campaigning has barely begun. But the CEC's website already contains downloadable Excel exports of candidate lists, a full registry of observer organizations with member data, and identifiable CEC staff names -- all accessible through predictable URL patterns that require no authentication.
Fifty-four days before Armenians go to the polls, the infrastructure that will run their election is already leaking data.
What Is Exposed
CONFIRMED The elections.am website exposes several categories of election data through publicly accessible URLs:
- Observer organization registrations -- 13 organizations registered for June 7, each with downloadable Excel files listing their registered members
- Candidate list Excel exports -- National candidate lists (candidateId 64235, 64246, 64250, 64254) and Territorial Election Commission lists (candidateId range 64533-65803), all downloadable
- CEC staff names -- 10 Central Election Commission personnel identified through the system
- Voter personal portal -- my.elections.am, the portal where individual voters access their data
- OpenID configuration -- the authentication configuration file exposed at /.well-known/openid-configuration
The Excel exports are the most concerning. Candidate lists and observer member rolls are being served as downloadable spreadsheets. Anyone who can construct the correct URL -- and the URL pattern is predictable once you have one example -- can download these files. There is no authentication gate. There is no access control. The data is simply there, waiting to be collected.
The Observer List
CONFIRMED Thirteen organizations have registered as election observers for the June 7 vote. Each registration includes a downloadable Excel file containing the names of their observer members:
| # | ORGANIZATION | REG ID | TYPE |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Armenian Public TV | #24 | STATE MEDIA |
| 2 | CivilNet | #26 | INDEPENDENT |
| 3 | Aravot (aravot.am) | #27 | INDEPENDENT |
| 4 | Kentron TV | #29 | PRIVATE MEDIA |
| 5 | Shant TV | #49 | PRIVATE MEDIA |
| 6 | Radiolur | #50 | STATE MEDIA |
| 7 | Mediahub.am | #54 | INDEPENDENT |
| 8 | Panorama.am | #58 | INDEPENDENT |
| 9 | Armenpress | #62 | STATE MEDIA |
| 10 | Infocom.am | #64 | INDEPENDENT |
| 11 | Sputnik Armenia | #67 | RUSSIAN STATE MEDIA |
| 12 | Aysor.am | #73 | INDEPENDENT |
| 13 | ABC Media | #78 | INDEPENDENT |
Notable patterns: Three Armenian state media outlets (Public TV, Radiolur, Armenpress) will observe the election run by the government they serve. Sputnik Armenia -- a Russian state media operation -- has observer status in an Armenian election. The independent outlets range from established platforms like CivilNet and Aravot to smaller digital operations.
Each of these 13 organizations has a downloadable Excel file on the CEC website listing their observer members by name. These are the people who will be inside polling stations on June 7. Their identities are publicly downloadable today.
The CEC Staff
IDENTIFIED The elections.am system reveals 10 Central Election Commission staff members by name. These are the officials who will administer the June 7 election:
These ten people will oversee the mechanics of an election in which the ruling Civil Contract party -- already accused of election interference, military voting pressure, and fake donor schemes -- seeks to retain power. Their names, their roles, and their presence in the system are all discoverable through a basic web audit.
Election Infrastructure Map
CONFIRMED Beyond the main elections.am portal, three additional subdomains form the election infrastructure:
The my.elections.am voter portal is particularly sensitive. This is where individual Armenian citizens access their voter registration data. The online.elections.am subdomain suggests electronic voting infrastructure. The testelearning.elections.am subdomain -- with its "test" prefix -- indicates a non-production environment that may contain training data, test accounts, or configuration details that mirror the production system.
The exposed OpenID configuration at /.well-known/openid-configuration reveals the authentication architecture: which endpoints handle logins, how tokens are issued, what scopes are supported. This is a roadmap for anyone attempting to understand -- or exploit -- the election system's authentication layer.
Who Designed This System
CONFIRMED Armenia's electoral system was designed under the influence of Daniel Ioannisyan and his organization, the Union of Informed Citizens. Ioannisyan's NGO has received $228,000 in funding from the Open Society Foundations -- George Soros's grant-making network.
The Union of Informed Citizens did not merely observe Armenian elections. They shaped the rules. Ioannisyan was instrumental in designing the electoral framework that governs how Armenian elections are conducted -- the registration systems, the observation protocols, the data management procedures. The man funded by foreign foundations wrote the rules of the game that determines who governs Armenia.
This is the same pattern OWL has documented across Armenian government institutions: Western-funded NGO operatives do not just monitor or advise. They design the systems themselves. And the systems they design are the ones now leaking data 54 days before a national election.
$228,000 from the Open Society Foundations bought influence over the rules that 2.6 million Armenian voters will live under. Whether that influence was benign or malign, the fact remains: a foreign-funded organization wrote the electoral rulebook for a sovereign nation. Armenians were not consulted about whether they wanted George Soros's grantees designing their democracy.
Why This Matters
ELECTION INTEGRITY With 54 days until Armenia's parliamentary election, here is what we already know:
- Observer member lists are downloadable -- anyone can identify who will be inside polling stations on election day
- Candidate lists are exportable -- Excel spreadsheets with full candidate data are accessible through predictable URLs
- CEC staff are identifiable -- the 10 people administering the election are named in the public system
- The voter portal exists at my.elections.am -- individual voter data sits behind whatever authentication the CEC has implemented
- A test environment is exposed -- testelearning.elections.am may contain configuration data that mirrors production
- The authentication architecture is documented -- the OpenID configuration reveals how the system handles logins and tokens
This is not a post-election audit. This is a pre-election warning. The infrastructure is already visible. The data is already accessible. Any state actor, political party, or motivated individual with basic OSINT skills can monitor this system in real time -- watching for changes to candidate lists, new observer registrations, modifications to staff assignments, and alterations to the voting infrastructure.
Civil Contract has already been accused of election interference in previous cycles: military voting pressure where soldiers were forced to photograph their ballots, fake donor schemes to circumvent campaign finance limits, and systematic use of state resources for party purposes. The June 7 election infrastructure is now visible to anyone who wants to watch. Any manipulation will leave digital fingerprints.
OWL Election Watch
OWL will monitor elections.am infrastructure daily from now until June 7, 2026. Every change to candidate lists will be archived. Every new observer registration will be documented. Every modification to CEC staff assignments will be recorded. We have already taken baseline snapshots of all accessible data as of April 14, 2026.
If candidates are added or removed, we will report it. If observer organizations are registered or deregistered, we will report it. If the voter portal at my.elections.am changes its authentication or data exposure, we will report it. If Excel exports are modified between now and election day, we will have the before-and-after comparison.
Armenia's elections belong to the Armenian people -- not to the party in power, not to the CEC staff who administer them, and not to the foreign-funded organizations that designed the rules. Fifty-four days from now, 2.6 million voters will decide Armenia's future. OWL will make sure the infrastructure they vote through is watched by someone who answers to no one.
54 DAYS. EVERY CHANGE DOCUMENTED. EVERY EXPORT ARCHIVED. WE ARE WATCHING.